The Global Secure Information Exchange System (GSIXS, written and pronounced as G6), known as mìngyùn (命运, destiny) in China, is a worldwide biosecurity and health informatics network owned by Zhupao and administered by the United Nations (UN). It was developed in 2040 as part of a China-led multilateral response to the CMD pandemic.
The public health mandate continues to be G6’s chief responsibility, though its information technology (IT) package, which combines artificial intelligence (AI) solutions with implanted neural colloids, has found use in a wide range of additional network services. Zhupao offers these services to clients in an opt-in platform model, with custom licensing agreements on top of the UN-mandated biosecurity functionality. Data is mined uniformly and stored by G6 so it can be shared in the event of a global alert issued by the World Health Organisation (WHO), but its further interpretation and feedback ultimately falls under national responsibility.
Though credited with a central role in the mitigation of biorisk, the role of G6 in society continues to be a contentious issue in global politics and has raised discussions by academic and human rights organisations, corporations, small governments, and religious groups.
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In China, G6 is officially known as mìngyùn (命运, destiny), a name chosen in February 2040 by former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Chen Baoqiang. It was taken from mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ (命运共同体, community with a shared destiny), a slogan propagated by Chen’s predecessors Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao. To designate mìngyùn outside of China, the Global Secure Information Exchange System name and G6 acronym were coined by Xu Shaoyong in March 2041 during a World Health Organisation (WHO) working group. Following the network’s international rollout, G6 has found enduring usage as its most common name.
On February 23rd 2040, then-CCP General Secretary Chen Baoqiang announced that the third plenary session of the 17th National People’s Congress (NPC) would convene earlier to discuss an overhaul of China’s healthcare system in response to the CMD pandemic. This overhaul, which Chen dubbed mìngyùn in his announcement speech, involved bringing together China’s public and private healthcare sectors on a single platform developed primarily by Huawei and the China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC). This is generally considered to be the first iteration of G6 as an intersectoral healthcare network meant to provide mainland China with standardised practices and applications for biosecurity and health informatics.
In the same speech, Chen also announced that the CCP was in the final negotiating stages with the WHO to adopt its contact tracing strategy, which involved the distribution of diagnostic colloids supplied by Zhupao to accurately track the spread of Cariappa-Muren disease (CMD). CCP representatives had been stalling the negotiations due to their insistence that, instead of Zhupao’s colloid designs, Huawei’s implantable multielectrode arrays (MEAs) be used for CMD contact tracing efforts in China, with the reasoning that Huawei’s MEAs were already being introduced to national sectors reliant on recording and stimulating neural activity as early as November 2037.
On March 21st 2040, the CCP welcomed then-WHO Director-General Yang Jinglei and Sunil Cariappa to China, stating that the two had been invited to bring their experience in the fight against CMD to bear on the development of mìngyùn and the distribution of Huawei’s MEAs. Cariappa later clarified that he had been unaware of any such mission and that the purpose of his visit had been explained to him as “purely epidemiological.” On April 3rd 2040, Xu Shaoyong accused the CCP of misleading Cariappa and dismissed mìngyùn as an attempt to “present China’s surveillance apparatus inside the wrapping of a necessary tool for biosecurity, as both disciplines involve the intimate tracking and profiling of people.”
On April 10th 2040, a leaked set of procurement notices filed by Huawei and the CETC revealed that the Social Credit System (SCS) and the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) were being merged with mìngyùn under the CCP’s “one person, one file” directive, proving Xu’s claims. Amidst widespread protests and accusations that the CCP was planning to “extend its brutal hold over Xinjiang across all of China under cover of the pandemic,” development on mìngyùn was halted on April 12th 2040.
The project was resumed on May 3rd 2040 when the CCP entered into a cooperation strategy with the WHO to “strengthen the national healthcare system, ensure that quality health services are delivered to the people, and enrich China’s contribution to global health and biosecurity.”  This strategy included a partnership between Zhupao and the National Health Commission (NHC) to redevelop China’s healthcare system from the ground up using Zhupao’s information technology (IT) and colloid designs. On May 7th 2040, GPHIN 2.0 was officially unveiled during a Zhupao conference as “a new WHO-endorsed standard for biosecurity, health informatics, and implantable medical devices (IMDs),” with Xu naming Cariappa, Spencer Hagen, and Efua Amankwah-Crouse as the team leads of the project.
After the first GPHIN 2.0 testbed was finalised on September 3rd 2040, the CCP announced a series of pilot programmes organised by the NHC to test GPHIN 2.0 at scale in the Chinese provinces of Guangdong, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Zhejiang. On September 23rd 2040, Zhupao held a conference to unveil the colloids that were being administered to Chinese citizens as part of the pilot programmes. After injecting one of the colloids himself, Xu explained that their individual electrodes contained the necessary hardware to support both CMD-specific nanosensors and a means of neurometric identification. Xu also announced a set of GPHIN 2.0 trials in cooperation with select state and private hospitals in Canada, London City, and Sri Lanka. On October 31st 2040, the CCP declared the pilot programmes a success and announced its intention to introduce GPHIN 2.0 to all its territories and special economic zones (SEZs) under the mìngyùn name.
In November 2040, China requested then-United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Luis Carlos Díaz to convene an emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to propose “the international adoption of mìngyùn as a united front against CMD and its spread.” The session’s first sitting on November 29th 2040 was dominated by questions of its legitimacy and Díaz’s refusal to put China’s proposal to an assembly vote, arguing that mìngyùn’s narrow focus on CMD, use of data mining, and inclusion of neurometric colloids “warranted deeper scrutiny.” The session was reconvened for a second sitting on December 11th 2040, but again adjourned without a vote due to opposition from the United States (US). When Díaz echoed critiques of mìngyùn previously voiced by Cariappa and Amankwah-Crouse, China began to ignore him, boycotting official functions involving him and addressing all communications to the Secretariat instead of the UNSG.
The emergency session was convened and adjourned for three additional sittings between December 2040 and February 2041. During the sixth and final sitting on February 8th 2041, Díaz abruptly announced his resignation as UNSG, relating his personal experiences in Venezuela as the motive for his distrust of mìngyùn. To prevent the sixth session from adjourning, China enacted a plan to bypass the Security Council and pushed for then-General Assembly President Maria Vahekeni Cardoso to carry out Díaz’s duties as acting UNSG. In a concession to Díaz, Cardoso stipulated that she would only call a vote on China’s proposal if all UN member states that voted in favour committed to the organisation of national referendums so that the electorates could have their say on the adoption of mìngyùn. On February 11th 2041, the emergency session was adjourned after the UNGA passed Resolution ES-13/6 with a required two-thirds majority of 128 votes to 31 against.
In March and April 2041, the WHO organised several working groups with Zhupao and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to outline the terms of a WHO charter for the international use of G6 (then renamed from mìngyùn), including its integration with the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and the WHO’s global alert system. In April 2041, Zhupao presented G6-BASIC as a “baseline, opt-in” licensing tier for the implementation of G6, with the network’s national and cross-border deployment strictly defined by the WHO charter. To avoid any confusion, the ITU incorporated the 6G technology standard into G6 in May 2041.
In the spring and summer of 2041, 92 of the 128 countries that supported Resolution ES-13/6 called a series of referendums and snap elections on the question of whether to adopt G6, with over 60% of pro-G6 campaigns and appeals having succeeded by the end of 2041. Many countries that voted in favour of implementing G6 made national defence funds available for the licensing of G6-BASIC, which led to a worldwide drop in military spending and a series of geopolitical shifts mainly concerned with fitting the cross-border exchange of G6 data into new or existing unions and protocols.  In response, Zhupao provided custom G6 licensing tiers for data sharing plans between countries. 
Zhupao’s rollout of G6 was delayed in June 2041 due to the impact of Typhoon 4109, which destroyed Endoptic‘s main production facility in Borneo and severely limited the company’s manufacturing capacity until the fall of 2041, when construction on eight new facilities outside Colombo, Sri Lanka was completed. The international adoption of G6 steadily increased over the following years, but stalled in October 2045 when a breach of Zhupao’s corporate network revealed that G6 had been heavily retrofitted with quantum neural networks (QNNs) between October 2040 and June 2041, which had not been disclosed to the public. The data breach also indicated that Zhupao had been using G6 to aid authorities in the search for Adira, an individual or group with the capability of bypassing G6’s quantum cryptographic security. Since this use of G6 was considered in violation of the WHO charter, UNSG Cardoso issued Zhupao with an official caution.
In June 2047, China reported that G6 had flagged a rise in symptomatic cases of CMD, which led to widespread fears that the second wave of the CMD pandemic was starting earlier than epidemiological forecasts had indicated. The WHO prepared logistics for the declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), but held off when G6 data coming out of Russia identified the second wave of CMD as a surge in cases of cerebral small vessel disease (CSVD), which has a neurological symptomatology similar to that of CMD. When other countries reported cases of CSVD in the fall of 2047, Yuri Golitsyn accused China of “trading on CMD phobia” and repeated claims that G6 is “so overfocused on CMD as to render it blind to other constellations of symptoms.” 
The revelations from the 2045 data breach, the rise in neurocarceral states, and the 2047 false alarm on the second wave of CMD have contributed to a more outspoken anti-G6 sentiment from countries and political groups. In the Indian elections in March 2049, the YourStory party won a plurality of parliamentary seats on the promise of greater transparency on the country’s G6 licensing agreements, with Prime Minister Jagrati Thass having personally campaigned on withdrawing from G6. In the summer of 2049, several US states sued the US government for state-level rights to independently define G6 affiliations. In September 2049, Russian President Denis Molchalin faced a leadership challenge from a United Russia faction opposed to Russia’s membership of G6.
During a press conference on September 28th 2049, Xu was asked whether he expected the trend of G6 licensees questioning their memberships to continue. Xu replied by listing off the network’s accomplishments and encouraged all nations to embrace G6, stating that “it continues to be our wall against the next wave of CMD. The more countries contribute, the better G6 becomes. We need to do this because that is how the system works. That is how it will save us all.”
G6 is primarily licensed to governments, but an undisclosed number of corporations, organisations, and individuals have privately implemented G6 solutions. The distribution of G6 and its affiliated services are controlled by Zhupao and processed through Datalign. Specific legal and infrastructural implementations vary on a client-by-client basis, though these are invariably set within a series of parameters dictated by the WHO charter.
As a network, G6 is multimodular and relies on swarms of peer-to-peer (P2P) systems which are either distributed, centralised, or decentralised, depending on specific subsystems. Zhupao’s promotional materials describe G6 as rhizomatic, depicting a network that has no single point of failure, can recover from unexpected intrusions, and exists “everywhere and nowhere at once” rather than in a single host location.
Authentication and access control is managed through a restricted number of verified owner-actors tasked with ensuring trust between the network’s nodes. Zhupao defines G6 members as owners and actors in that they have unrestricted access to read and store data on G6 while also contributing to the network’s growth and accuracy with their own data. Owner-actors are granted validation rights as long as their G6 subscription meets certain requirements and does not lapse. The owner-actor model and the reliance on validated nodes is meant to ensure the security and resiliency of the network.
G6 membership is available to clients who enter into a licensing agreement with Zhupao. The baseline licensing tier is G6-BASIC, which limits the network’s functionality to what is strictly required for the purposes of biosecurity, as laid out by the WHO charter. G6-BASIC offers technical G6 infrastructure integrated by Datalign, neural colloids provided by Endoptic, and a single owner-actor verification for data mining and analysis focused on health informatics and contact tracing. In 2041, Zhupao developed a dedicated opt-in platform model that allows G6 members to license different levels of access to G6 hardware and software on top of G6-BASIC. The costs of a G6-BASIC licence are calculated based on a flexible income share agreement (ISA) based on a given client’s yearly revenues.
Zhupao has faced criticism from human rights organisations for enabling the use of G6 as a tool for mass surveillance, behavioural modification, and neurosurveillance. In 2044, an investigation crowdsourced by Five of Swords uncovered that South Korea’s membership of G6 was being used for unapproved neurostimulation in its citizens, with the purpose of discouraging any interest in travel or conscious efforts to leave the country.  The FoS investigation led to South Korea being the first country labelled a neurocarceral state by the UN.
In September 2040, Cory Doctorow wrote an essay titled The Neurometric Panopticon, in which he described G6 as an “à la carte menu for multimodular oppression.” Doctorow echoed his previous comments on Zhupao’s deployment of neurometric colloids and claimed that “a G6-BASIC colloid, any colloid really, is more versatile than Zhupao would have you believe, and lends itself rather well to out-of-the-box surveillance applications hidden behind Endoptic’s complex web of patents, licenses, and non-disclosure agreements.”  Doctorow’s essay was rediscovered in October 2045, when a Zhupao data breach revealed a number of G6 licensing agreements that included the monitoring of neural states using G6-BASIC colloids. Doctorow was praised for his prescience, though he called it “not so much prescient as observant.”
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